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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of Case:

The nature of the underlying case is that for workers' compensation benefits due
Claimant, VerDene Page. Ms. Page's underlying workers' compensation claim was settled upon
lump sum basis by that Order of the Idaho State Industrial Commission dated November 9, 2011,
pertaining to all Title 72 benefits excepting prospective medical benefits; and, potential
prospective Title 72 medical benefits were settled by the Commission's Order dated August 17,
2012. Following those settlements, the only issue remaining is the entitlement of Ms. Page's
counsel, Clyel Berry, to attorney's fees for his representation of Ms. Page throughout the Title 72
proceedings. The instant appeal relates to attorney fee issues.
II.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition:

Claimant/Co-Appellant herein, VerDene Page, suffered injury upon August 17, 2001.
Ms. Page retained

counsel, Clyel Berry, upon April 24, 2002. Defendants Employer and

Surety denied the Title 72 claim, in its entirety. Hearing before the Idaho State Industrial
Commission was held upon April 22, 2003. Thereafter, the Commission entered its December 8,
2003 Order, holding that Ms. Page failed to prove a compensable "accident," and that her oral
notice to the employer was insufficient.
Ms. Page filed appeal from the December 8, 2003, decision.

The Supreme Court

thereafter released its Opinion in Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 109 P.3d 1084,
upon February 17, 2005, determining that the Commission erred in concluding that Ms. Page
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failed to prove an "accident," and/or that her oral notice was insufficient. The matter was then
remanded to the Idaho State Industrial Commission for further proceedings.
The Commission released its Order on Remand upon June 14, 2005, finding that Ms.
Page was entitled to medical and temporary total disability benefits for the period August 18
through November 26, 2001; and, awarded five percent (5%) permanent partial disability,
inclusive of permanent impairment.
Counsel then filed Ms. Page's Motion for Reconsideration; Motion for Additional
Findings; and, Alternative Motion to Reopen. The Commission released its Order Regarding
Pending Motions, denying the same, upon September 23, 2005. Claimant's Second Motion for
Reconsideration was then filed. By its Order dated November 23, 2005, the Commission denied
that Motion.
By reason of disagreement between Title 72 Defendants and Claimant as to the
computation of benefits awarded by the Order on Remand, Claimant's Motion for Entry of Order
for Award Sum Certain/Motion for Additional Findings was filed. After an evidentiary hearing
the Commission released its Order determining with specificity benefits due Claimant pursuant
to the June 14, 2005, Order on Remand, and awarding fees by reason of Defendants' conduct.
By instrument dated January 18, 2006, Claimant's Motion for LC. § 72-719(3) Review to
Correct Manifest Injustice was filed. Thereafter, the Commission filed its Order Dismissing
Further Reconsideration, dated March 16, 2006.
Ms. Page's second appeal then followed. The Supreme Court issued its Opinion in Page
v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265, upon January 31, 2008, and again
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remanded the matter to the Commission. Subsequently herein, the February 17, 2005, Supreme
Court Opinion will be referenced as "Page I," and the January 31, 2008, Opinion will be
referenced as "Page II."
Upon November 1, 2008, Claimant's Request for Calendaring; and, Request for
Emergency Hearing was filed. The parties thereafter agreed to mediation, which was held upon
February 12, 2009, but was not successful.
Another full evidentiary hearing was held before the Commission upon April 9, 2009.
Thereafter, the Commission released its September 8, 2009, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order, which awarded Ms. Page benefits totaling two hundred fifty-four thousa11d four
hundred one dollars and eighty-six cents ($254,401.86).

Issues then remaining before the

Commission included Ms. Page's entitlement to medical benefits for right TKA; entitlement to
temporary disability benefits following September 21, 2008; entitlement to permanent partial
impairment; and, entitlement to permanent disability in excess of impairment.
Following further medical procedures and Ms. Page achieving maximum medical
stability therefrom, hearing upon Title 72 Defendants' responsibility for additional benefits was
set for September 20, 2011. Approximately three weeks prior to hearing, the Title 72 parties
agreed to vacate and again proceeded to mediation, with Industrial Commissioner Thomas P.
Baskin as mediator. At mediation, all remaining Title 72 claims against Defendants Employer
and Surety were settled by two Agreements. One Agreement provided that Title 72 Defendants
prepare and present a Set-Aside for Medicare approval, as Ms. Page was then a Medicare
beneficiary/recipient, regarding future potential medical procedures.
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Ultimately, Title 72

Defendants funded the Medicare Set-Aside by paying eight thousand seven hundred fifty-four
dollars ($8,754.00). The second Agreement encompassed all other Title 72 benefits. Pursuant
thereto, Defendants paid consideration of two hundred forty-eight thousand seven hundred fifty
dollars ($248,750.00), new and additional monies. The Commission approved each of these
Agreements, with the exception of the request of Ms. Page and counsel that the Commission
approve fees at the contingent rate of forty percent (40%).
A Request for Calendaring re Claimant's Counsel's Petition for Approval of
Fees/Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing was then filed. Hearing upon said Petition
was held upon March 10, 2012, at which Ms. Page appeared and participated. The Commission
entered its Order on Attorney Fees limiting fees to thirty percent (30%), upon June 21, 2012. A
Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and, Brief in Support of Said Motion
was filed by instrument dated July 3, 2012.

The Commission entered its Order on

Reconsideration Regarding Attorney Fees upon November 19, 2012, denying said Motion.
Upon the same date, the Commission entered its Order Granting Motion to Intervene, filed by
Ms. Page's counsel, Clyel Berry, individually.

Thereafter, Notice of Appeal was filed by

instrument dated December 6, 2012.

III.

Statement of Facts:
1.

Personal Data and Employment History for Claimant, VerDene Page:

Ms. Page was born upon

; is now within months of being sixty-nine years

of age; and, is formally educated through the tenth grade. Tr., April 22, 2003, hearing, p. 30, LL.
4-12; p. 33, LL. 15-16. Subsequently herein, the transcript for the April 22, 2003, hearing will
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be designated as "Tr. I"; the transcript of the February 2, 2006, hearing will be designated as "Tr.
II"; and, the transcript for the April 10, 2012, hearing will be designated as "Tr. III."
Throughout her adult life, Ms. Page has had but two employments. Her first employment
was seasonal, at a potato packing facility, which lasted for three summers and was labor
intensive. Tr. I, p. 34, L. 14 - p. 37, L. 8. Ms. Page's second employment commenced in 1974,
with the Title 72 employer's predecessor, Ore-Ida. Tr. I, p. 37, L. 13 - p. 38, L. 7. After
McCain Foods purchased Ore-Ida, Ms. Page's employment with McCain Foods continued over a
period of approximately twenty-seven years, to the August 17, 2001, industrial accident. Ms.
Page's employment at Ore-Ida and McCain Foods was labor intensive. Tr. I, p. 42, L. 3 - p. 49,
L. 17.

At the time of the industrial injury, Ms. Page earned an average weekly wage of
five hundred eight dollars and twenty cents ($508.20). Non-wage benefits included vacation,
retirement and group health insurance coverages for Ms. Page and her family.

R. 1/12/04

Appeal, p. 1, 5; Tr. I, p. 55, L. 6 - p. 56: L. 7. For purposes of identification, subsequently
herein the Clerk's Record relative to Page I will be designated "R. I"; the Clerk's Record
relative to Page II will be designated "R. II"; and, the Agency's Record flowing from the instant
Appeal will be designated "R. III."
2.

Personal Data and Employment History for Claimant's Counsel, Clyel

Berry:

Cly el Berry has been a licensed attorney practicing within the State of Idaho from
April, 1976, through current. During this almost thirty-seven year period, Berry's practice has
primarily been limited to the areas of personal injury and workers' compensation law. Affidavit
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ofL. Clyel Berry in Support of Petition for Approval of Fees, dated December 17, 2009, p. 12, at
paragraph 21g, Exhibit 8, R. III.
3.
Berry's Employment by and Representation of Ms. Page in the Underlying
Title 72 Proceedings:
Clyel Berry was retained by Ms. Page pursuant to a Contingent Fee Agreement dated
April 24, 2002. p. 2, paragraph 2, Exhibit 8, R. III. A true and accurate copy of said Fee
Agreement is attached as Exhibit A to said Exhibit. Pursuant thereto, attorney's fees were upon a
contingent basis of,
" ... 25% of all benefits obtained for you by L. Clyel Berry prior to the date your
claim is scheduled for hearing. Once hearing in the matter has been commenced,
attorney's fees will then be equal to 30% of all benefits obtained for you by L.
Clyel Berry. Following the filing of an appeal or if the matter is scheduled for
rehearing, attorney's fees will then be 40% of all benefits obtained."
April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement, at paragraph 4 thereof.
Ms. Page's industrial accident was upon her arising from a seated position and
experiencing pain in her left knee. Ms. Page's initial conference with Berry upon April 24, 2002,
was for a matter umelated to any Title 72 claim. Ms. Page had not realized that the August 17,
2001, occurrence could constitute an industrial accident. Tr. I, p. 85, L. 22 -p. 86, L. 9; Tr. III,
p. 20, L. 21

p. 21, L. 5. After counsel advised Ms. Page that she may have a Title 72 claim

relating to the August 17, 2001, event, the April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement was fully
discussed. It was further discussed that in light of difficulties perceived by counsel regarding Ms.
Page's potential Title 72 claim, if Title 72 proceedings required an appeal, fees upon post-appeal
benefits would be at forty percent (40%). Ms. Page fully understood the fee agreement and
agreed to the san1e. Tr. III, p. 21, LL. 3 - 23.
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The detailed description of the proceedings required to resolve Ms. Page's Title 72 claims
has been previously addressed within the instant Brief.

Following Ms. Page being denied

benefits upon the initial hearing, by the Commission's Order dated December 8, 2003; the appeal
of the December 8, 2003, Order in Page I; and, the disappointing benefits awarded by the
Commission within its June 14, 2005, Order on Remand, Ms. Page was exhausted, felt
victimized by the Title 72 proceedings, and was not inclined to further pursue her Title 72
claims. It was counsel who convinced Ms. Page to allow him to appeal the June 14, 2005, Order
on Remand. Tr. III, p. 21, L. 24- p. 22, L. 14.

4.

Ms. Page's Concurrence With and Joinder in Petition for Approval of Fees:

As above-noted. at the time that counsel was retained by Ms. Page, the Contingent Fee
Agreement was fully discussed with and understood by Ms. Page. Following the September 8,
2009, Award, the December 17, 2009 Petition for Approval of Fees was filed. By that Petition,
the Commission was requested to approve the April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement. Prior
to the filing of that Petition or the Affidavit of L. Clyel Berry in Support, both instruments were
forwarded to Ms. Page for review, with counsel's correspondence of December 17, 2009, which
advised Ms. Page that,
"[a]t this point, I wish to state the obvious. To the extent that I am asking the
Commission to approve fees greater than 30%, your interests are not compatible
with mine. This simply means that you certainly have the prerogative of
requesting that the Commission not allow fees in excess of 30% as, to the extent
that the Commission fails to approve fees greater than 30%, you would receive
additional monies from your workers' compensation claim corresponding with
the Commission's decision. Upon my prior occasions to discuss this issue with
you, it has been my understanding that you are actually supportive of my Petition.
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However, if not, I would hope that you would speak candidly to me upon this
issue."
Second Affidavit of L. Clyel Berry in Support of Petition for Approval of Fees, dated December
28, 2009, together with the copy of the December 17, 2009, correspondence to Ms. Page attached
thereto. Exhibit 9, R. III.
Thereafter, counsel received Ms. Page's Approval and Joinder in Petition for Approval of
Fees, dated and signed by her upon December 22, 2009. Exhibit S-5, R. III. Ms. Page also
telephoned counsel to advise that if the Commission declined to approve the Petition, Ms. Page
wished to gift those monies to counsel. Tr. III, p. 23, L. 7 -p. 24, L. 15. Ms. Page's support for
counsel's fees at the forty percent (40%) rate has been unwaivering. At hearing, she reconfirmed
that support. Tr. III, p. 24, LL. 16-18.
The importance to Ms. Page and her family of her workers' compensation claim was
discussed by Ms. Page during the April 10, 2012, hearing, as follows:
"Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Are you glad that you allowed me to file the appeal?
Yes, I am.
Are you satisfied with the benefits that you have been - Very satisfied.
- - that you have received? Are you satisfied with my work product?
Very satisfied.
Anything about me you want to - - derogatory you want to share with the
Commission?
He just - - he tries to get you to do it whether you want to or not. He just
tells you you 're worth something instead of just giving up and - - I mean I
- - I think he's done a fantastic job and he done more than I or my family
ever expected. We are all thrilled with it."

Tr. III, p. 25, LL. 4-19.
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5.

Summary of Commission Orders upon Fee Issue:
a.

Order Regarding Attorney Fees, dated April 1, 2010. Exhibit 6, R. III.

Although the Petition for Approval of Fees as well as Ms. Page's Approval and Joinder
each requested approval of fees pursuant to the April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement, the
Commission's April 1, 2010, Order only discussed benefits awarded by the Commission's
September 8, 2009, decision, and limited fees to thirty percent (30%) of the value thereof.
b.

Amended Order Approving in Part Stipulation and Agreement of Lump

Sum Discharge, dated December 9, 2011. Exhibit S-8, R. III.
By its Amended Order, the Commission noted that it had approved fees of thirty percent

(30%) from previous benefits, and limited fees to thirty percent (30%) upon the value of the Title
72 parties' lump sum settlement. Thusly, the Order encompassed not only benefits achieved
upon lump sum settlement, but also those awarded/received prior thereto.
c.

Order on Attorney Fees, filed June 21, 2012. R. III, pp. 118-125.

To the extent pertinent to the instant Appeal, that Order held as follows:
(1)

Denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed upon the April 1,

2010, Order Regarding Attorney Fees.
(2)

Determined that the LC. § 72-804 fee award must be accepted by

counsel as payment in full of his fees. In doing so, the Commission determined that an
LC. § 72-804 fee award should not be included within benefits against which a claimant's
counsel may impose fees.
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(3)

Approved fees upon the value of the lump sum settlement at the

contingent rate of forty percent (40%).
(4)

Approved fees at thirty percent (30%) upon the May 18, 2006,

benefit payment.
d.

Order on Reconsideration Regarding Attorney Fees, dated November 19,

2012. R. III, pp. 155 -159.
To the extent pertinent to the instant appeal, this Order again held that counsel was not
entitled to fees, to any extent, upon the value of an I. C. § 72-804 fee award.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Idaho State Industrial Commission err in limiting attorney fees upon

benefits awarded by the September 8, 2009, Order to thirty percent (30%) of the value thereof?
a.

Did the Idaho State Industrial Commission err in reviewing the Petition

for Approval of Fees submitted pursuant to LC.§ 72-803, upon the basis of LC. § 72-804?
b.

Was the Idaho State Industrial Commission without jurisdiction to modify

and/or reject a Contingent Fee Agreement upon a Fee Petition in which Ms. Page specifically
joined; there was no fee dispute by and between counsel and Ms. Page; and, no guidelines had
been promulgated pertaining to fees presumed reasonable by the Commission upon rehearing or
following appeal?
(1)

Did the conduct of the Idaho State Industrial Commi.ssion in sua

sponte reducing an uncontested fee agreement without properly enacted regulations or guidelines
constitute a deprivation of property rights in violation of the Contract and Due Process Clauses
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as well as the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and/or Article 1, Section
16 of the Idaho Constitution?
2.

Did the Idaho State Industrial Commission err by denying fees, to any extent,

upon the value of the LC. § 72-804 fee award within the September 8, 2009, Order?
a.

Does the refusal of the Idaho State Industrial Commission to approve a

claimant's attorney's fees upon the value of an LC. § 72-804 award violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution, where attorneys representing Title 72 defendants are at
liberty to charge their clients for time and services in defending that same LC.§ 72-804 claim?
b.

\\'hether the services of L. Clyel Berry, Chartered and/or Clyel Berry,

individually, operated primarily or substantially to secure the LC. § 72-804 fee award within the
September 8, 2009, Decision, such that said fee award constitutes "available funds" to which a
"charging lien" may attach?
(1)

If so, did the Idaho State Industrial Commission err in failing to

follow the guidelines established by and within IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c, promulgated by the
Commission as the "Rule Governing Approval of Attorney Fees in Workers' Compensation
Cases?"
c.

Whether IDAPA 17.02.08.033 and/or the interpretation and application

thereof by the Idaho State Industrial Commission contravene the underlying purpose of the
Workers' Compensation Act, codified by and within LC. § 72-201, that the Commission is
constrained to promote under LC. § 72-508?
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3.

Did the Idaho State Industrial Commission err in refusing to approve fees greater

than thirty percent (30%) upon benefits awarded/received prior to the September 8, 2009, Order?
a.

Is counsel entitled to fees greater than thirty percent (30%) upon benefits

awarded by the Commission's Findings upon Remand, dated June 14, 2005?
b.

Is counsel entitled to fees greater than thirty percent (30%) upon the May

18, 2006, benefit payment?
4.

Did the Idaho State Industrial Commission err by its failure to discuss within its

Orders and/or Decisions appealed from, to any extent, whether the fees requested were
reasonable upon consideration of the April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement and/or factors
set forth withinHogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 684 P.2d 990 (1984)?
5.

Whether the Idaho State Industrial Commission's findings, rationale and/or

determinations within the Orders appealed from, to the extent adverse to Appellants herein, are
erroneous as a matter of law; supported by substantial and competent evidence of record; set
forth specific findings necessary and required for meaningful appellate review; are arbitrary,
capricious, and/or the product of abuse of discretion; or, whether relevant thereto, the
Commission failed to make proper application of law to the evidence and/or facts of record
herein, in reaching the same?
6.

Whether the Commission's Notices for the April 10, 2012, hearing upon

counsel's Petition for Approval of Fees failed to comply with the mandate of LC.§ 72-713, by
not identifying as issues whether the LC. § 72-804 fee award was subject to attorney fees, and/or
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that counsel's fees upon the September 8, 2009, Order would be limited to the LC. § 72-804 fee
award, thereby denying opportunity of counsel to adequately prepare for the same?
7.

Whether Clyel Berry, individually, and/or L. Clyel Berry, Chartered, are entitled

to reasonable attorney fees on appeal herein, either pursuant to the "Private Attorney General
Doctrine" and/or I.C. § 12-117(1 ), together with Rule 41, Idaho Appellate Rules?
ARGUMENT
L

Standard ofAppellate Review:

The Court may set aside an order or award by the Industrial Commission if: (1) the
Commission's findings of fact are not based on substantial competent evidence; (2) the
Commission acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its powers; (3) the findings of fact, order
or award were procured by fraud; or, (4) the findings of fact do not as a matter oflaw support the
order or award. LC. § 72-732; Ewins v. Allied Sec., 138 Idaho 343, 63 P.3d 469 (2003). The
Supreme Court exercises free review over the Commission's legal conclusions but does not
disturb factual findings that are supported by substantial and competent evidence.

The

substantial evidence rule requires the Court to determine whether the findings of fact are
reasonable. Mulder v. Liberty N. W. Ins. Co., 135 Idaho 52, 14 P.3d 372 (2000)
Detern1ining the meaning of a statute or applying law to undisputed facts constitutes
matters of law on appeal. An appellate court may apply the law to undisputed facts, de novo.
Martel v. Bulotti, 138 Idaho 451, 65 P.3d 192 (2003). The Court is required to set aside the

order of the Commission where the Commission failed to make a "proper application of law to
the evidence." Where the Commission's conclusions of law are unsupported by its findings of
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fact, the decision of the Commission must be vacated. Bortz v. Payless Drug Store, 110 Idaho
942, 719 P.2d 1202 (1986).

To properly review an order of the Commission under the

appropriate standard, it is essential that the order of the Commission be based upon reviewable
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132, 136 (1993);
Iverson v. Farming, 103 Idaho 527, 650 P.2d 669, 672 (1982).
IL

Preliminary Statement:

Ms. Page's industrial injury occurred upon August 17, 2001. By settlement approved by
the Commission upon August 8, 2012, Ms. Page's Title 72 claims were fully and finally
resolved. The litigation of those Title 72 claims encompassed a period just one week shy of
eleven years, and resolution was only achieved by reason of and following an extraordinary and
epic legal journey before the Industrial Commission and Idaho's Supreme Court, involving six
contested and fully briefed motions; multiple mediations; three evidentiary hearings before the
Commission; and, two appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court. Counsel is aware of no other Title
72 claim requiring litigation or procedures at both the Commission and appellate levels which
remotely approximates those required in the instant matter.
With the Title 72 claims of Ms. Page having been fully and finally resolved, the instant
appeal concerns the issue of Ms. Page's attorney's entitlement to compensation for his efforts.
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III.
The Idaho State Industrial Commission Erred in Limiting Attorney Fees upon Benefits
Awarded by the September 8, 2009, Order to Thirty Percent (30%) of the Value Thereof.
1.
The Idaho State Industrial Commission Erred in Reviewing the Petition for
Approval of Fees Submitted Pursuant to I.C. § 72-803, upon the Basis of I.C. § 72-804.

By the Commission's Orders herein, counsel's fees were "capped" by the LC. § 72-804
fee award. The I.C. § 72-804 fee award was granted by the Commission's September 8, 2009,
Order. Pursuant to that Order, Title 72 Defendants and Claimant entered into a Stipulation
Regarding Attorney Fees providing that the I.C. § 72-804 award be for fees equal to thirty
percent (30%) of the value of benefits encompassed within the September 8, 2009, Order.
Exhibit S-2, R. III. That Stipulation was approved by the Commission by its Order Granting
Stipulation, dated October 22, 2009. Exhibit S-3, R. III. In reviewing both the Stipulation as well
as the Commission's Order, counsel notes the obvious.

Neither the Stipulation nor the

Commission's Order hint that either would have any effect upon the Contingent Fee Agreement
entered into by and between Ms. Page and her counsel, or attorney's fees due counsel for his
representation of Ms. Page in her Title 72 proceedings. In this regard, counsel takes exception to
the Commission's more recent characterization of the Stipulation and the October 22, 2009,
Order.
Within the Commission's Order on Attorney Fees, the Commission stated that,
"A stipulation was submitted stating that Counsel agreed to accept, and
Defendants agreed to pay, 30% of the total benefits awarded in the September 8,
2009, order as attorney fees to counsel." (Emphasis added.)

R. III, p. 119. The Order also noted that,
"The most important fact in the assessment of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho
Code § 72-804 and the Commission's September 2009 order in this case is that
Counsel and Defendants came to an agreement as to the amount of attorney fees
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Defendants would pay counsel in satisfaction of the award of Idaho Code § 72804 attorney fees .... Counsel chose to accept 30% attorney fees from the
September 2009 order. The Commission will not award additional attorney fees
on the same benefits." (Emphasis added.)
R. Ill, p. 121 - 122.

This finding is not only without support of, but actually misstates the clear record herein.
The Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees reads,
"COME NOW the parties, ... and hereby stipulate that attorney fees due Claimant
by and from Defendants herein pursuant to the September 8, 2009, Award shall
be the sum equal to thirty (30) percent of the value of Title 72 benefits awarded
Claimant by and/or encompassed within said September 8, 2009, Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order." (Emphasis added.)
Exhibit S-2, R. III.
Similarly, the actual language of the Commission's October 22, 2009, Order Granting
Stipulation, to the extent pertinent to the instant issue, is that,
' ... the parties ... filed a stipulation regarding attorney fees. The parties have
agreed that, ... Defendants will pay to Claimant attorney fees in the amount of
30% of the value of the workers' compensation benefits awarded to Claimant by
the decision." (Emphasis added.)
Exhibit S-3, R. III.
Clearly, what was identified by the Commission as the "most important fact" in its
consideration of fees from the September 8, 2009, Award, does not exist.

There was no

"agreement" on the part of Ms. Page's counsel to accept fees encompassed within the parties'
Stipulation rather than the fees to which he was entitled pursuant to the Contingent Fee
Agreement. The issue then turns to whether counsel is otherwise required to accept an LC. §
72-804 fee award in lieu of fees to which he is otherwise entitled. Logically, the response must
be in the negative.
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Limiting counsel's fees to the LC. § 72-804 award is clearly in error. Most certainly,
fees approved pursuant to LC. § 72-803 as well as fees awarded pursuant to LC. § 72-804 must,
each, be reasonable. However, factors to be considered in determining "reasonable fees" as
between the two Code sections are not identical.
The I. C. § 72-804 fee award was by reason of Defendants' conduct for a specific period
of time. The September 8, 2009, Order, by Findings 38 and 39, clearly awarded fees by reason
of Defendants' conduct following Page II. The Commission therein specifically determined that
Defendants were then no longer entitled to rely upon prior decisions of the Commission which
had been overturned by the Supreme Court, and that Defendants' denial of Ms. Page's claim for
total knee replacement following Page II without expert medical opinion was "a clear
derogation" of the workers' compensation statutes. Exhibit S-1, R. Ill, pp. 13-14.
Defendants' conduct prior to Page II could not be considered in determining
"reasonable" LC. § 72-804 fees awarded by the September 8, 2009, Order. Rather, Defendants'
obligation for fees was limited to conduct following Page II, which required the April 19, 2009,
hearing.

As such, Defendants' obligation for fees was thirty percent (30%), by analogy to

IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.3.ii. In other words, Defendants' obligation for fees was for a period
not requiring or encompassing a Supreme Court appeal.
It was error for the Commission to consider the Petition for Approval of Fees upon the

basis of LC. § 72-804. Rather, the Commission should have considered the Petition upon the
basis of LC. § 72:.803. In this regard, the Petition encompassed the entirety of counsel's workproduct upon behalf of Ms. Page in these proceedings, then spanning multiple hearings and two
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appeals, as opposed to only the period following Page II to the September 8, 2009, Order, within
which the LC. § 72-804 fee award was granted.

Thusly, the Petition should have been

considered by the Commission upon the basis of LC. § 72-803, together with IDAP A
17.02.08.033 and controlling case law.
Further, irrespective of the above, the Commission was in error in capping counsel's fees
at the LC. § 72-804 fee award. In Hogaboom, supra, the Court cited Berger, Court Awarded

Attorney's Fees: What is "Reasonable"? 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 281, 282 (1977), for the
proposition that,
"Under either equitable or statutory rationales for fee awards, the amount the
client agreed to pay the attorney does not necessarily determine what others
should be compelled to pay by the Court. . .. What constitutes a reasonable fee
may be more or less than the client is obligated to pay the attorney."
684 P.2d 993. This Court has specifically determined that a statutory fee award may be more or
less than that provided in the contingent fee contract Ada County High. Dist. v. Acarrequi, 105
Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067, at 1072 (1983).
2.
The Idaho State Industrial Commission was Without Jurisdiction to Modify
and/or Disregard the Contingent Fee Agreement Upon a Fee Petition in Which Claimant
Specifically Joined; There Was No Fee Dispute by and Between Counsel and Claimant;
and, No Guidelines Had Been Promulgated Pertaining to Fees Considered Reasonable by
the Commission upon Rehearing or Following Appeal.

Most certainly, the Petition for Approval of Fees submitted to the Commission pursuant
to LC. § 72-803 was absent any "dispute" between Ms. Page and counsel. Rather, the instant
appeal involves the Commission refusing to approve a Contingent Fee Agreement upon a Fee
Petition in which Ms. Page specifically joined. Exhibit S-5, R. III. Prior to being retained by
Ms. Page, counsel thoroughly discussed the Contingent Fee Agreement with her, inclusive of the
Appellant's Opening Brief - 18

provision that upon appeal fees would increase to forty percent (40%). At the April 10, 2012,
hearing, Ms. Page testified that she had understood the fee structure set forth within the
Agreement and agreed to the same. Tr. III, p. 21, LL. 6-23. Ms. Page also confirmed that upon
being advised that the Commission initially denied fees at greater than thirty percent (30%), she
telephoned counsel and offered to "gift" him the differential in fees.

At hearing, Ms. Page

expressed that she had "no problem" with fees at forty percent (40%). Tr. III, p. 23, L. 4-p. 24,
L. 8.

In Curr, this Court specifically held that, "[i]n sua sponte modifying uncontested attorney
fees absent the guideline of a properly enacted regulatory scheme, the Commission ... exceeds
(its) statutory authority." 864 P.2d 137.
Upon review of IDAPA 17.02.08.033, it is clear that no guidelines have been
promulgated which speak as to fees in Title 72 matters following appeals or rehearing. This
omission is made all the more perplexing and confusing by the Commission's mandate, within
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.d, that a Title 72 fee agreement be in conformity with Rule 1.5, Idaho
Rules of Professional Conduct. IRPC 1.5(c) specifically requires that contingent fee rates for
settlement, trial or appeal shall be separately provided for within the fee agreement, and thusly
that fees for each stage of the proceeding may well be different. In Curr this Court held that,
"Without clear guidelines nestled in appropriately promulgated regulations,
attorney's actions are plagued by doubt, which may have a chilling effect on the
underlying purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act that the Commission is
constrained to promote under LC. § 72-508."
864 P.2d 137.
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In Rhodes v. Industrial Commission, 125 Idaho 139, 868 P.2d 467, 469, this Court
stressed the importance of "predictability" in the application of LC. § 72-803. However,
"predictability" is nowhere to be found in the instant matter. As example, the Commission's
Orders, collectively, result in fees, as follows:
a.

Thirty percent (30%), upon benefits awarded by the Commission's
Findings upon Remand.

b.

Thirty percent (30%), upon benefits encompassed within the May 18,
2006, benefit payment.

c.

Thirty percent (30%), upon benefits encompassed within the September 8,
2009, Award.

d.

Forty percent (30%), upon benefits encompassed within the Title 72
parties' lump sum settlement (excepting future medicals).

There is absolutely no reason why the Commission approved contingent fees at different
rates for benefits obtained following Page II. The Commission's approval of fees pursuant to
LC. § 72-803 and/or IDAPA enactments were without continuity or "predictability," to any
extent.
By its June 21, 2012, Order on Attorney Fees the Commission, citing Hogaboom, supra,
determined that it,
" ... has no need to approve or modify the contingent fee agreement entered into
between Claimant and Counsel.
While instructive in detennining the
understanding of the parties at the outset of the case, the contingent fee agreement
is not determinative of the fees to be awarded by the Commission in an award of
Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney fees or Idaho Code§ 72-803."
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It is respectfully submitted that the Commission cited Hogaboom out of context.

What the

Court actually said in Hogaboom was that the contingent fee agreement, " ... though persuasive
evidence, is not itself dispositive, but rather must be considered in conjunction with the factors
cited in Clark .. .in order to determine whether the fee ... is reasonable under all the
circumstances." 684 P.2d 993.
In the instant case, the Commission simply ignored the Fee Agreement. Such was error.
In Curr the issue, as here, concerned the Commission's approval of fees pursuant to I.C. § 72803. There, Court stated,
"Under I.C. § 72-803, the Commission has a duty to approve or disapprove
attorney fee claims. The basis for approval depends upon a finding that the fee
agreement sails the wake of reasonableness. Reasonableness, in turn, derives
from the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of the parties at the
time that the fee agreement was made. Two cases, Hogaboom v. Economy
Mattress, and Clark v. Sage, offer helpful, but not determinative, factors to be
thoughtfully considered when ascertaining reasonableness." (Internal citations
omitted. Emphasis added).
864 P.2d at 136.
The Hogaboom factors relevant to the instant matter were before the Commission within
counsel's Affidavit in Support of Petition for Approval of Fees, at pp. 8-13. Exhibit 8, R. Ill.
Those factors were up-dated by counsel's Third Affidavit in Support of Petition for Approval of
Fees (R. Ill, pp. 13-28), and discussed within Claimant's Post-Hearing Brief Upon Attorney Fee
Issue, at pages 7-11 thereof. R.III, pp. 72-76.
The Order Regarding Attorney Fees, dated April 1, 2010, acknowledged that counsel's
Affidavits had discussed each of the Hogaboom factors. However, by its June 21, 2012, Order
on Attorney Fees, the Commission determined that the most important fact considered by it was
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the parties' Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees, which the Commission erroneously construed
as counsel's "agreement for fees,'' previously discussed herein at pp. 16-17.
At this juncture, counsel notes that the Commission did approve fees at forty percent
(40%) from the proceeds upon lump sum settlement, pursuant to the Contingent Fee Agreement
between himself and Ms. Page. In doing so, the Commission noted,
" ... the long road that this case has taken and the dogged persistence which
(counsel) maintained through the years of litigation at the Commission and the
Idaho Supreme Court. Claimant testified that it was counsel who pushed her
along and had faith, even after unfavorable decisions, that the claim was valid and
worth pursuing. Counsel's efforts in this case are beyond the ordinary case and
the Commission finds that such an effort entitles counsel to a fee beyond the
ordinary."

R. III, p. 123. It is respectfully submitted that these comments describing counsel's efforts in
his representation of Ms. Page are also applicable to the September 8, 2009, Award, and that but
for the Commission re-writing the parties' Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees it would have
been equally compelled to approve fees at forty percent (40%) upon the September 8, 2009,
Award.
If the Commission's position that a claimant's counsel's fees are limited to an LC. § 72-

804 fee award is upheld, claimants' attorneys, across the board, will be disinclined to prosecute
any LC. § 72-804 claim, to the detriment of Title 72 claimants as well as the public policy
expressed by and within LC. § 72-201, to provide " ... sure and certain relief for injured
workmen," that the Commission is constrained to promote under LC. § 72-508. The "realworld" effect of the Commission's position is that claimant's counsel's fees will be limited to
any LC. § 72-804 fee award, and that counsel will receive no compensation for prosecuting the
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I.C. § 72-804 fee claim. It should be obvious that an I.C. § 72-804 claim is always vigorously
defended and requires significant resources to successfully prosecute. After the Commission
determines that a Title 72 claimant is entitled to fees, securing those fees requires additional
efforts by the claimant's counsel. Counsel first attempts to negotiate the amount of fees due with
Title 72 defendants.

If those negotiations fail, securing the fee award requires yet another

evidentiary hearing, where the sole issue is the amount of the I.C. § 72-804 fee award. Of
course, the Title 72 defendants then have the option to appeal.
Not only should the Commission logically not require that counsel's services (in
prosecuting an LC. § 72-804 fee claim) be without anticipation of fees, such was specifically
rejected by this Court in Curr. 864 P.2d 138.
3.
Modifying and/or Refusing to Consider the April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee
Agreement Violates the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions.

The Curr Court held that,
"An attorney fee agreement constitutes a valid contract under Idaho law, and

(attorneys perform services for their clients) in reliance upon the terms of their fee
agreements. It is clear that, in Idaho, parties to a contract have a property interest
in the subject matter of the contract that is protectable both under the Contract
Clause and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. In addition,
the right to follow a recognized and useful occupation is protected by a
Constitutional guarantee of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13."
864 P.2d 137-8.

Curr furthered determined that, at a mmnnum, the Commission must,

" ... formally publish clear guidelines upon which it will base fee modifications in order to
eliminate any latent arbitrariness." Absent such, "[t]he net result of the Commission's sua
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sponte conduct is a deprivation of (the attorney's) property rights under the fee agreement
without due process oflaw."
The underlying facts herein are exactly on point to those considered by the Court in

Curr. In the instant matter, the Commission had not enacted guidelines, clear or otherwise,
regarding attorney's fees in Title 72 matters following appeals or upon rehearing. It therefore
follows that the conduct of the Commission herein violates the Contract and Due Process
Clauses of the Idaho and United States Constitutions as well as the guarantee of liberty afforded
thereby, as specifically determined by Curr.

4.
The Idaho State Industrial Commission Erred by Denying Fees, to Any
Extent, upon the Value of the J.C. § 72-804 Fee Award Within the September 8, 2009,
Order.
By its June 21, 2012, Order, the Commission took "exception" to counsel treating an LC.
§ 72-804 fee award as a benefit to his client, against which contingent fees could lie. Such
constitutes clear error. This Court has previously determined that, " ... an award of attorney fees
in a workers' compensation case must be deemed compensation to the injured employee .... "

Dennis v. School District# 91, 135 Idaho 94, 15 P.3d 329, at 333 (2000). Thusly, an LC. § 72804 fee award, being compensation to the Claimant, should be treated no differently than other
Title 72 benefits achieved by reason of a Claimant's attorney's efforts, for purposes of the
parties' Contingent Fee Agreement.
The LC. § 72-804 fee award within the Commission's September 8, 2009, Order required
counsel's energies, time, resources and work-product, no different than other benefits
encompassed within that Order. But for the efforts of counsel Ms. Page would have received
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nothing from her Title 72 claim, and most certainly would not have received the LC. § 72-804
fee award. Both counsel and Ms. Page fully anticipated that upon counsel's efforts generating a
fee award, counsel would be entitled to fees therefrom pursuant to their Contingent Fee
Agreement. Affidavit of Clyel Berry in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, generally, and
specifically Exhibit A thereof. R. III, at pp. 134-141.
The Commission's denial of fees upon an LC. § 72-804 fee award is in disregard to and
contravention of IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c, promulgated as the "Rule Governing Approval of
Attorney Fees in Workers' Compensation Cases." As noted by subparagraph .01 thereof, said
Rule was intended " ... to govern the approval of attorney fees."

(Emphasis added).

The

"governing" consideration, pursuant to the Rule, is whether the services of counsel, " ... operated
primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid." If so,
the LC. § 72-804 fee award constitutes "available funds" to which counsel's "charging lien"
attaches.
The entirety of Ms. Page's Title 72 recovery, inclusive of LC. § 72-804 fees, was
achieved solely by reason of counsel's efforts. By definition, the LC. § 72-804 fee award
constitutes "available funds" secured primarily or substantially by the services of counsel out of
which counsel seeks to be paid pursuant to the Contingent Fee Agreement between Ms. Page and
himself. IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c does not limit or define "available funds" by the nature or
type of Title 72 monies recovered. Thusly, upon consideration of the Commission's "Rule
Governing Approval of Attorney Fees in Workers' Compensation Cases," the requested fees, if
otherwise reasonable, must be approved and allowed as against the LC. § 72-804 fee award.
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Absent potential of entitlement to fees upon an I.C. § 72-804 fee award, claimants'
counsel could not invest their time or offices' resources required to develop and prosecute an LC.
§ 72-804 claim. It must be recalled that as fees are calculated upon a contingency basis, claimant
receives the lion's share of any fee award and thusly is greatly benefited thereby. Counsel's
prosecution of an I.C. § 72-804 fee award also provides valuable public services to the workers
of Idaho and the Commission, by bringing wrongful conduct and practices of employers and
their sureties to the attention of the Commission, and thereby serves to both punish past and
deters potential future wrongful conduct by Title 72 Defendants.
The Commission's position requires that a claimant's attorney's time, resources, energies
and work-product required to develop and prosecute an LC. § 72-804 fee claim be without
fees. Such is not realistic and was specifically rejected by the Court in Curr. 864 P.2d 138.
Lastly upon this issue, counsel notes that he reviewed the propriety of adding fee awards
to the "pot" of other Title 72 benefits to be disbursed pursuant to a contingent fee agreement with
Attorney Tom High, who served upon the Committee for Professionalism for the Idaho State
Bar, and was also a hearings officer for disciplinary complaints against attorneys, with the issue
oft-times involving the propriety of fees between an attorney and that attorney's client. Mr. High
advised counsel of his belief and understanding that adding fee awards to the recovery to be
disbursed pursuant to the Contingent Fee Agreement is the practice, procedure and custom
followed by most attorneys, and of his opinion that the same is the procedure which should be
followed.

Tr. Ill, p. 36, LL. 7-23; Affidavit of Clyel Berry in Support of Motion for

Reconsideration, at paragraph 6, pp. 3-4, R. III, pp. 134-141.

Appellant's Opening Brief - 26

a.
The refusal of the Idaho State Industrial Commission to approve a
Claimant's attorney's fee upon the value of an I.C. § 72-804 award violates the Idaho and
United States Constitutions.
The prosecution of an I.C. § 72-804 fee claim requires significant briefing and, absent
agreement between claimant and Title 72 defendants upon the amount of fees,

a separate

evidentiary hearing before the Commission. Yet, irrespective of the efforts of counsel and the
benefit of those efforts to counsel's client, it is the position of the Commission that claimant's
counsel is entitled to no fees, whatsoever, upon an I.C. § 72-804 award.
The Commission's refusal to approve fees upon an I.C. § 72-804 fee award violates the
equal protection clauses of the Idaho and United States Constitutions; the Contract Clause of the
United States Constitution; and, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
together with Article 1, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution.

In Curr, this Court noted that the attorney fee agreement constitutes a valid contract
pursuant to which the claimant's attorney performs services upon behalf of his client. The Court
continued that,
"It is clear that, in Idaho, parties to a contract have a property interest in the
subject matter of the contract that is protectable under both the Contract Clause
and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. In addition, the
right to follow a recognized and useful occupation is protected by a constitutional
guarantee of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
and Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13." (Internal citations omitted).

864 P.2d 138.
The Commission's discharge of its responsibilities pursuant to I.C. § 72-803, or more
appropriately the withholding of the same regarding an LC. § 72-804 fee award, also violates the
equal protection clauses of the State and U.S. Constitutions. This Court has noted that the equal
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protection clause is designed to ensure that persons similarly situated with respect to a
governmental action should be treated similarly. Primary Health v. State Dept. ofAdmin., 137
Idaho 666, 52 P.3d 307, 313 (2002). In the instant matter, the Commission refuses to approve
any fees upon an LC. § 72-804 fee award. However, Title 72 defendants' counsel are not so
constrained. Defendants' counsel is at liberty to charge and collect fees from his clients for
services in defending LC. § 72-804 claims, even where those services fail to benefit his clients.
Title 72 defendants' counsel is an attorney licensed for the practice of law, as is
claimant's counsel. Each counsel represents Title 72 parties litigant. Each is subject to the same
"governmental action," being decisions of the Idaho State Industrial Commission. Yet, with
respect to LC. § 72-804 claims, Title 72 defendants' counsel and claimant's counsel are not
treated similarly. Title 72 defendants' counsel has expectation of fees, win or lose. Claimant's
counsel is denied fees, even should his efforts prevail.
Irrespective of constitutional argument, the logic and rationale of the Commission's
position escapes this counsel. The Commission fully expects a claimant's counsel to prosecute
an LC. § 72-804 claim without expectation of fees where defendants' counsel is at liberty to
impose fees upon his clients to defend the LC. § 72-804 fee argument, which fees are neither
scrutinized by nor require the Commission's approval as a condition precedent to payment,
irrespective of the fact that it is defendants' conduct by reason of which the LC. § 72-804 fee
award is entered.
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IV.
The Commission's Notices for the April 10, 2012, /tearing upon counsel's Petition for
Approval of Fees failed to comply with the mandate of J.C.§ 72-713, by not identifying issues
to be heard therein.
By its April 1, 2010, Order Regarding Attorney Fees (Exhibit 6, R. III), the Commission
determined that fees pursuant to the Contingent Fee Agreement were not reasonable. Thereafter,
Claimant's Request for Calendaring re Claimant's Counsel's Petition for Approval of
Fees/Request for IDAPA Hearing was filed. R. III, pp. 3-9. The only issue therein identified
was " ... whether circumstances in the instant case are such that the Idaho State Industrial
Commission should or will approve attorney's fees at the rate of forty (40%) percent,... ."
Hearing was thereafter scheduled by the Commission's Notices dated December 2, 2011, and
January 12, 2012. R. III, pp. 8-11. Neither Notice identified any "issue" to be heard within the
April 10, 2012, hearing.
LC. § 72-713 mandates that, "[t]he Commission shall give at least ten (10) days' written
notice of the time and place of hearing and of the issues to be heard, .... " (Emphasis Added).
The Commission's June 21, 2012, Order on Attorney Fees, upon page 1 thereof, acknowledged
that, "[t]he Commission is aware that ... recitation of the issues was not presented prior to
hearing, .... " R. III, at 118.
Prior to hearing, counsel was not aware of the Commission's position that an LC. §
72-804 fee award could not be added into the "pot" of benefits, to thereafter be disbursed
pursuant to the applicable Contingent Fee Agreement; or, that the Commission would allow no
fees, whatsoever, upon benefits encompassed within an LC. § 72-804 fee award.

By the

Commission's failure to both set forth the reasons why the Petition for Approval of Fees was
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originally denied, as required by ID APA, and its failure to provide prior notice of issues to be
heard at hearing, the Commission violated procedural due process.

V.
The Idaho State Industrial Commission Erred in Refusing to Approve Fees Greater
than Thirty Percent (30%) upon Benefits Awarded/Received Prior to the September 8, 2009,
Award and Not Encompassed Therein.
In the Commission's consideration of the Petition for Approval of Fees, it was agued by

counsel that even if benefits encompassed within the September 8, 2009, Order were limited by
the parties' Stipulation, fees upon Title 72 benefits not encompassed within that Order were not
subject to or controlled by that Stipulation. During the April 10, 2012, hearing, Commissioner
Limbaugh advised that he agreed. Tr. III, p. 43, LL. 2-14. Such was also argued by counsel
within Claimant's Post-Hearing Brief Upon Attorney Fee Issue, at IIB and III thereof. R. III, pp.
66-118.
For reasons not explained by the Commission within any of its Orders, fees upon benefits
awarded by the Order on Remand and the May 18, 2006, Title 72 benefit check were limited to
thirty percent (30%). Both by the Confidential Addendum to Lump Sum Settlement Agreement
(Exhibit 1, R. Ill, at pages 13-14) and the Summary and Accounting of Title 72 Benefits
(Exhibit 1 to Claimant's Post-Hearing Brief Upon Attorney Fee Issue, R. Ill, at pages 96-101),
the Commission was fully advised that counsel had received fees upon benefits encompassed
within the Order on Remand of thirty percent (30%); held in trust the ten percent (10%)
differential between fees at thirty percent (30%) and fees at forty percent (40%); and, was
requesting LC. § 72-803 approval for fees at the forty percent (40%) rate.
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To the best of this counsel's review of the record, benefits encompassed within the
Order on Remand were inferentially addressed within the Amended Order Approving in Part
Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge. Exhibit S-8, R. III. At page 2 thereof, it
states that "[t]he Commission has approved fees of 30% from previous benefits awarded to
Claimant and will do so for this settlement." Fees upon benefits encompassed within the Order
on Remand were also inferentially encompassed within the June 21, 2012, Order on Attorney
Fees, by the Commission's calculations within "Amount Remaining in Trust," at pages 8 and 9
thereof. R. III, pp. 118-125.
With respect to fees upon benefits encompassed within the May 18, 2006, payment, the
Order on Attorney Fees determined, at page 8,
"Counsel further requests attorney fees from the $15,630.73 benefit check issued
on May 18, 2006. Counsel states that in an oversight he did not deduct fees from
that check. The Commission will approve counsel's request for 30% of
$15,630.73 in attorney fees, equaling $4,689.22." (Emphasis added).

R. III, p. 123.
In approving fees at thirty percent (30%), the Commission misstated counsel's request for
LC. § 72-803 approval. Counsel's actual and specific request for LC. § 72-803 approval upon
the May 18, 2006, benefit check is set forth within section III of Claimant's Post-Hearing Brief,
as follows:
"Although request is made for approval of fees at forty (40%) percent, being
$6,252.29, at the minimum counsel would be entitled to fees at a thirty (30%)
percent rate, being $4,689.22." (Emphasis added).

R. Ill, p. 25.
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Clearly, counsel requested approval of fees at a forty percent (40%) rate.

Benefits

encompassed within the Commission's Order on Remand and/or the May 18, 2006, benefit
check were not encompassed within the September 8, 2009, Order, and not subject to the
parties' Stipulation, even if that Stipulation somehow superseded the Contingent Fee Agreement
between Ms. Page and counsel.
It is respectfully submitted that counsel is entitled to fees of forty percent (40%) upon

benefits encompassed within both the Order on Remand as well as the May 18, 2006, benefit
check, upon the Commission's rationale and analysis in approving fees at forty percent (40%)
upon benefits within the Title 72 parties' lump sum settlement. There is absolutely no basis to
determine otherwise.

VI.
The Idaho State Industrial Commission Erred by its Failure to Discuss Within Its
Orders and/or Decisions Appealed From, to Any Extent, Whether the Fees Requested Were
Reasonable.
There are four instruments filed of record wherein the Commission considered
Claimant's counsel's attorney fees, being the Order Regarding Attorney Fees, dated April 1,
2010 (Exhibit 6, R. III); the Amended Order Approving in Part Stipulation and Agreement of
Lump Sum Discharge, dated December 9, 2011 (Exhibit S-8, R. III); the Order on Attorney
Fees, dated June 21, 2012 (R. III, pp. 118-125); and, the Order on Reconsideration Regarding
Attorney Fees, dated November 19, 2012 (R. III, pp. 155-159).
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Within the April 1, 2010, Order Regarding Attorney Fees, the Commission considered
the Petition for Approval.

The Order identified the nine factors expressed by Hogaboom;

acknowledged that the Affidavit of Berry in Support of Petition for Approval of Fees discussed
each of the Hogaboom factors; and, recited that, "[h]aving considered Mr. Berry's Petition and
the Hogaboom factors, we do not find the requested fee of 40% to be reasonable," upon the basis
that, "Claimant and Defendants have stipulated to fees at 30%." Order Regarding Attorney Fees
at page 2. Thus, without comment upon the sufficiency of the Hogaboom factors discussed
within counsel's Affidavit, the Commission determined that the Title 72 parties' Stipulation
trumped discussion of whether the Contingent Fee Agreement entered into by and between Ms.
Page and counsel was otherwise reasonable.
The Amended Order Approving In Part Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum
Discharge revisited the fee issue.

Exhibit S-8, R. III. The entirety of the Commission's

discussion of fees is as follows:
"The total lump sum amount is $248,750.00. Fees from that amount have been
requested at 40%. Such a fee has not been substantiated to the Commission in
accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033. The Commission has approved fees of
30% from previous benefits awarded to Claimant and will do so for this
settlement."
Order Approving in Part, at page 2.
The IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.B hearing upon the Petition for Approval of Fees
was held upon April 10, 2012. Thereafter, the Commission entered its Order on Attorney
Fees. R. III, p. 118. Thereby, the Commission determined as follows:
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1.

Fees upon the value of benefits awarded by the September 8, 2009, Order.

A Motion for Reconsideration had been filed upon the Commission's Order Regarding
Attorney Fees. In ruling upon that Motion, the Commission refused to discuss or consider the
April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement, determining that it,
" ... has no need to approve or modify the contingent fee agreement entered into
between Claimant and Counsel.
While instructive in determining the
understanding of the parties at the outset of the case, the contingent fee agreement
is not determinative of the fees to be awarded by the Commission in an award of
Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney fees or Idaho Code § 72-803."

R. III, pp. 121-122.
It is significant to the instant appeal that this Order sets forth the Commission's position

that it has " ... no need to approve or modify the contingent fee agreement entered into between
Claimant and Counsel." Thusly, from the perspective of the Commission the Contingent Fee
Agreement between Ms. Page and counsel was irrelevant and without consequence, as would
then be any consideration of the Hogaboom factors.
In fact, during the April 10, 2012, hearing, Chairman Maynard acknowledged that the
Commission was not questioning the Contingent Fee Agreement, but that the Commission was
" ... not bound by any fee agreement." Tr. Ill, p. 32, LL. 12-14. The Commission's position
flies in the face of this Court's holding in Curr, supra, that a fee agreement's reasonableness
derives from the totality of circumstances from the perspective of the parties at the time that
agreement was made.
Secondly, the Commission's consideration of fees was without dispute between Ms. Page
and counsel. Thusly, again pursuant to Curr, supra, the Commission was without jurisdiction or
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authority to sua sponte modify the uncontested attorney fee agreement absent clear guidelines,
which the Commission conceded had not been established for Title 72 claims following appeal
or re-hearing. R. III, p. 122b. The Commission should not be at liberty to side-step this issue by
asserting that it did not "modify" the fee agreement, where it refused to even consider it.
2.
The June 21, 2012, Order held that a claimant's attorney was entitled to no fees,
whatsoever, upon the successful prosecution of an LC. § 72-804 Fee Award.
This holding of the Commission is addressed earlier in the instant brief, at pp. 25-29.
3.
The June 21, 2012, Order approved fees at forty percent (40%) upon the Title 72
parties' Lump Sum Settlement Agreement.
The June 21, 2012, Order acknowledged,· for the first time, that "Counsel's efforts in this
case are beyond the ordinary case and the Commission finds that such an effort entitles counsel
to a fee beyond the ordinary."
4.
The June 21, 2012, Order did not revisit its limitation of fees to thirty percent
(30%) upon benefits awarded prior to the September 8, 2009, Order.
Entitlement to fees at the forty percent (40%) rate upon both the June 14, 2005, Order
upon Remand as well as the May 18, 2006, benefit payment is previously addressed in the
instant brief, at pp. 31-33.
A Motion to Reconsider was filed upon the Commission's June 21, 2012, Order on
Attorney Fees. The Commission's Order on Reconsideration limited discussion to entitlement of
fees upon the I.C. § 72-804 fee award.

R. III, pp. 155-159.

In denying any fees, the

Commission merely noted that IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 does not apply to I.C. § 72-804 fee
awards, but governs lump sum settlements, and that, " ... awards of attorney fees under Idaho

Appellant's Opening Brief - 35

Code § 72-804 are guided by the analysis set forth in Hogaboom .. . ," but failed to address or
discuss any of the Hogaboom factors.
Curr, reaffirmed that,

"To properly review an order of the Commission under the appropriate standard
of review, it is essential that the order of the Commission be based upon
reviewable findings of fact and conclusions oflaw."
864 P.2d 136. In the instant matter, the Commission's progression of Orders upon the attorney
fee issue did not set forth either Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law. However the record
upon appeal clearly establishes that the Commission found that,
"The most important fact in the assessment of attorney fees (upon the September
8, 2009, Order) .. .is that Counsel and Defendants came to an agreement as to the
amount of attorney fees Defendants would pay Counsel. ... Counsel chose to
accept 30% attorney fees from the September 2009 order. The Commission will
not award additional attorney fees on the same benefits."

R. III, pp. 121-122.
As previously discussed, this finding misstates the clear record herein. Exhibit S-2, R.

III. In fact, the Commission's Order Granting Stipulation specifically noted that, "[t]he parties
have agreed that, ... Defendants will pay to Claimant attorney fees in the amount of 30% of the
value of the workers' compensation benefits awarded to Claimant .... "

(Emphasis added).

Exhibit S-3, R. Ill. The April 1, 2010, Order Regarding Attorney Fees also accurately noted
that, subsequent to the September 8, 2009, Order, " ... the parties stipulated that Defendants
would pay Claimant attorney fees in the amount of 30% of the value of the workers'
compensation benefits awarded by the decision." That Order further accurately noted that,
"Claimant and Defendants have stipulated to fees of 30%." (Emphasis added.) Exhibit 6, R. III,

Appellant's Opening Brief - 36

pp. 1-2. Thusly, the "finding" which the Commission specifically noted as the "most important
fact" in its consideration of fees from the September 8, 2009, Order, was one which it created
within the June 21, 2012, Order on Attorney Fees, and is clearly inconsistent with the record.
Further, the Commission's series of Orders upon the fee issue were without benefit of
any stated Conclusions of Law.

Rather, the Orders were based upon the Commission's

positions, without benefit of properly enacted guidelines, that no fees would be approved upon
the September 8, 2009, Order excess to the LC. § 72-804 fee award against Defendants; and, that
counsel is entitled to no fees for his services in successfully prosecuting that LC. § 72-804 fee
award.
Without discussion of the reasonableness of fees pursuant to the Contingent Fee
Agreement upon consideration of the Hogaboom factors, the findings, rationale and/or
determinations of the Commission within the Orders appealed from, to the extent adverse to
Appellants, are not supported by substantial and competent evidence of record; fail to set forth
specific findings necessary and required for meaningful appellate review; and, fail to
demonstrate that the Commission made proper application of law to the uncontroverted facts of
record herein.

VII. Is Appellant Berry Entitled to Attorney Fees Either Upon the Proceedings Before the
Commission Upon the Petition/or Approval of Fees; or, Upon Appeal, Pursuant to the Private
Attorney General Doctrine and/or Ida/to Code§ 12-117(1)?
In arguing entitlement to fees, counsel acknowledges that Curr held that the Private
Attorney General Doctrine does not apply to claims for attorney fees on appeal in workers'
compensation cases. 864 P.2d 140. Further, Smith v. Washington County Idaho, 136 Idaho
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542, 38 P.3d 121 (2010), determined that LC. § 12-117(1) does not allow a Court to award
attorney fees in an appeal from an administrative decision. Appellants invite the Court to revisit
these prior rulings.
Almost thirty-seven (3 7) years ago counsel graduated from law school with the
conviction that for every wrong there must be a remedy. Dean Menard lectured loud and often
that if the Court could be convinced that equity and common sense could lead to but a single just
result, it would find a way to right the wrong and reach the result that common sense, conscience
and equity demanded.
In the instant case, the legal path to secure Ms. Page the Title 72 benefits to which
counsel believed she was entitled was long, rocky and steep. Once Ms. Page's Title 72 benefits
were secured, counsel has been required to travel an equally difficult path in his attempt to
achieve LC. § 72-803 approval of the attorney fees provided for in the Contingent Fee
Agreement between Ms. Page and himself, culminating with the instant appeal.
By its Orders upon the fee issues, the Commission acknowledged that the Petition for
Approval of Fees was fully supported by Ms. Page, and that the Commission had not
promulgated guidelines, clear or otherwise, for fees upon rehearing or following appeal. R. III,
p. 122b. Of course, clear guidelines for fees were mandated by Curr and fully anticipated by

Rhodes, to be, " ... promulgated to foster ease, utility, and predictability in the application of I.C.

§ 72-803,. ... " 868 P .2d 469. The Commission also failed to follow or even discuss IDAP A
17.02.08.033, its "Rule Governing Approval of Attorney Fees in Workers' Compensation
Cases," in refusing to approve any fees upon the September 8, 2009, LC. § 72-804 fee award.
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Counsel cannot help but note that it was not until the Commission's June 21, 2012, Order
on Attorney Fees that it acknowledged,
" ... the long road that this case has taken and the dogged persistence which
(counsel) maintained through the years of litigation at the Commission and the
Idaho Supreme Court. . .. Counsel's efforts in this case are beyond the ordinary
case and the Commission finds that such an effort entitles Counsel to a fee
beyond the ordinary."

R. III, p. 123. These efforts of counsel were apparently overlooked by the Commission in both
its April 1, 2012, Order and the Amended Order Approving in Part Stipulation and Agreement of
Lump Sum Discharge, signed December 9, 2011, which each limited fees upon all Title 72
benefits to thirty percent (30%).
Within the April 10, 2012, hearing upon the Petition for Approval of Fees then Chairman
Maynard stated upon the record that the Commission was not questioning the Fee Agreement
between Ms. Page and counsel, " ... but (the Commissioners) are not bound by any fee
agreement." Tr. Ill, p. 32, LL. 12-14. It was also in that hearing, in the presence of Ms. Page
and certain of her family, that Commissioner Limbaugh admonished counsel that, " ... you can't
double dip." Tr. III, p. 9, L. 8.
Commissioner Limbaugh's implied accusation that counsel had "double dipped"
illustrates exactly the conduct on the part of the Commission which Curr sought to prevent. It
was therein noted that, " ... the Commission's arbitrary actions made suspect (counsels') integrity
in the eyes of their clients, thereby seriously undermining the attorney-client relationship." 864
P.2d 138. What makes Commissioner Limbaugh's statement all the more troubling is that he
later acknowledged that he had" ... seen the numbers and didn't think that (counsel) had (double
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dipped)." Tr. Ill, p. 9, LL. 23-25. There was therefore absolutely no reason to have made such
a disparaging remark toward counsel, with the sin being compounded by the presence of Ms.
Page.
Counsel's efforts to secure LC. § 72-803 approval of the Contingent Fee Agreement
between Ms. Page and himself have required significant of his time and office's resources. As
of Claimant's Post-Hearing Brief Upon Attorney Fee Issue, counsel had recorded 785.6 hours in
the instant matter. Had fees then been approved at the agreed forty percent (40%) rate, counsel's
effective hourly earnings would have been two hundred eighty-four dollars and seventy-one
cents ($284.71), being but fifty-nine dollars and seventy-one cents ($59.71) greater than his
hourly fee rate. R. Ill, p. 93.
It is clear that at the end of the day, absent an award of fees upon the instant appeal
counsel's effective hourly rate in the instant matter will fall far short of what he charges upon a
non-contingency basis, solely by reason of Commission conduct which Curr previously
determined to be arbitrary, capricious and a manifest abuse of discretion. Upon behalf of instant
counsel as well as attorneys representing Title 72 claimants in future proceedings, this result flies
in the face of both equity and common sense, and represents the wrong for which there must be a
remedy.
CONCLUSION

Curr, supra, clearly held that, in sua sponte modifying an uncontested fee agreement

absent clear guidelines nestled in appropriately promulgated regulations, the Commission acts
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beyond the bounds of its statutory authority. Curr determined that in doing so, the Commission
acts arbitrarily, capriciously and manifestly abuses its discretion. Curr reaffirmed that,
".. . a reasonable contingent fee must be sufficiently high to compensate the
lawyer not only for the reasonable value of the time he or she anticipates devoting
to the particular lawsuit, but also for the time devoted to other lawsuits
undertaken on the same basis but unsuccessful in result."
864 P.2d 139. Rhodes noted that the guidelines required by Curr should be such so as" ... to
foster ease, utility, and predictability in the application of I. C. § 72-803, .... " 868 P. 2d 469.
As of current date, guidelines promulgated by the Commission, being IDAP A
17.02.08.033.01, speak as to attorney fees only through the initial hearing. The Disclosure
Statement set forth within IDAPA 17.02.08.033.04 states that, "[d]epending upon the
circumstances of your case, (the claimant) and (the claimant's attorney) may agree to a higher or
lower percentage which would be subject to Commission approval."
Within its June 21, 2012, Order on Attorney Fees, the Commission conceded that,
"While, as Counsel argues, the IDAP A does not have a specific fee percentage set
for situations of cases that go to rehearing or on appeal, (the Commission) is able
to handle those situations within the current framework."
Such falls far short of the "clear guidelines nestled in appropriately promulgated regulations"
mandated by this Court in Curr, and ignores any expectation of the "predictability" envisioned
by Rhodes.
In the instant matter, the Commission failed to discuss the reasonableness of the
Contingent Fee Agreement at issue upon consideration of the Hogaboom factors; refused to
follow its own IDAPA "Rule Governing Approval of Attorney Fees in Workers' Compensation
Cases"; and, acted in excess of statutory authority, thusly infringing upon Appellants'
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constitutional rights. In sum, to co-equal extent as this Court found in Curr, by exceeding the
bounds of its statutory authority the Commission acted arbitrarily; acted capriciously; manifestly
abused its discretion; and, waded into regulatory conduct with indifference to constitutional
requirements that adhere to rights fixed by private contract.
It is respectfully submitted that the Commission's sua sponte reduction of fees herein

constitutes clear error and must be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this~ day of March, 2013.

L. Clyel B y
Attorney for Claimant-Appellant VerDene Page
Individually, as Intervenor-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on the
day of March, 2013, I served a copy of the foregoing document, by depositing a true copy
thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, upon the following:

rfl. ~

David Young
Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83 720
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